Existentialism as a Tendency: Important Insights & Basic Shortcomings

An essay written for 'Existentialism and Beyond', second year studies, September 2001. I received a mark of 32/40.

"Let us endeavour to live that when we come to die
even the undertaker will be sorry."
-- Mark Twain --

"..[N]othing could be further from the existentialist attitude than attempts to define existentialism, except perhaps discussion about the attempts to define existentialism" (Solomon, 1987, p. 245). Generally, as indicated in the preceding quote, existentialists are not so much concerned with defining the external world or describing some objective reality with a view to arriving at 'the truth'. The focus of existentialism is on the individual, subjective human being (although discussion of existence within a community of sorts or in relation to others occurs in both Sartre and Heidegger's philosophies) and as such, philosophical precedents for 'existentialising' are not readily available, except for from other existentialists. Whilst some existentialists, for example, Heidegger and Sartre are concerned with phenomenological analyses of the being of humans in the world and in relation to the being of objects, the central focus is on discovery of what and who we are and therefore how we should live. To put it rather simply, existentialists are concerned with how we can derive meaning from life, being irrational humans in a rational world.

So, rather than being a coherent body of thought, the term 'existentialism' refers to a tendency - a particular focus and style of thinking that existentialists generally share. A 'coherent body of thought' could be said to be one that is grounded in a shared ideological perspective and that arrives at a common conclusion or set of conclusions, based on a foundation of shared facts and knowledge regarding a particular aspect of 'reality'. In contrast, the essential factor that ties existentialism together as a philosophy and allows us to call it such is its focus on the individual human being in an absurd world. There are no shared assumptions (other than the fact that we exist at all), nor is there necessarily any consensus as to what we are and how we should live.

As this essay unfolds, it will hopefully become clear as to why existentialism is not a coherent body of thought and why it is best described instead as a tendency or style of philosophising. In this essay, I will examine existentialist philosophy with a view to outlining general tendencies, commonalities and divergences that are found in the writings of existentialist philosophers. A particular focus is on the writings of Sartre (due to the fact that he first coined the term 'existentialism' in relation to his own work) and Heidegger, in comparison and contrasted with one another to illustrate the philosophy as a whole. Due to the wide range of existentialist writings available, it was deemed necessary to focus only on those of two thinkers and as another important existentialist, Heidegger seems an appropriate choice to broadly represent existentialist thought. The aim of discussing general tendencies, commonalities and divergences is not only to give an introductory outline of existentialism, but to pinpoint and illuminate the important insights of existentialist philosophy, as well as to critically discuss its shortcomings.

As stated above, existentialism is a philosophy that finds its starting point with individual human existence. In doing so, it has often been thought to represent a "spirit of the present age" (Solomon, 1987, p. 238) and human existence within a world that is oftentimes referred to as 'absurd'. This starting point is important and in a sense, revolutionary due to the fact that the majority of other (metaphysical and ontological) philosophies prior to existentialism, have focused their attention on trying to establish certain 'facts' about the external world as it is, without due attention to the individual that interprets and finds him/herself within that world. In other words, existentialists begin with human being(s) instead of nature and is "a philosophy of the subject rather than the object" (MacQuarrie, 1972, p. 2). Considering that it is through human eyes that the world is interpreted and all scientific exploration and discovery is hinged on our understanding, existential philosophising fulfills an important role in relation to science, the world and the reasons for the existence of philosophy in the first place. However, due to its subjective nature, existentialism does not provide a coherent set of central tenets that one may use to explain and simplify what existentialism is. Instead, existentialism is best described as a lens through which one may view human existence, that colours our experience and opens up future possibilities for action in light of what and where we are. The end result of existential philosophising is most often an approach to life or a recipe for living that is the logical outcome of the particular path taken by an existentialist. I think it is fair to say, however, that to provide a recipe for living is not necessarily the explicit intention of 'existentialising', rather it is simply the end result that only becomes apparent in following the writer's process.

A common binding element in existentialist writings is the conception of human existence as bound up in states such as despair, anxiety and angst, and the 'absurdity' of our existence in relation to the world. For the most part angst, despair or even terror arises in individual human beings feeling themselves to be separate from the world and other human beings. The existential attitude is one of confusion, disorientation and non-acceptance of the world (Solomon, 1987, p. 239). Existentialism is essentially a response to such feelings - an attempt at lessening their impact and at owning one's life, being responsible and 'authentic' in view of the reality without succumbing to 'absurdity'. In fact, it could be said that one of the lasting contributions of existentialism is its treatment of the emotional life of human beings and the claim that it is through emotions and feelings such as anxiety, boredom and nausea that we are "involved in our world and can learn some things about it that are inaccessible to a merely subjective beholding" (MacQuarrie, 1972, p. 5).

Most existentialists have derived a conception of freedom (absolute or otherwise) from these feelings and Sartre's 'despair' in relation to absolute freedom is a strong case in point. For Sartre, the prominent affect is one of despair - a feeling derived from his somewhat controversial conception of absolute freedom. According to Sartre, consciousness consists of nothing beyond that which it focuses on, that is, consciousness is always conscious of something (Jones & Fogelin, 1997, p. 371). Furthermore, there is no "I" or thinker behind the thoughts - a stance contrary to all that in the west is held dear. That consciousness is 'nothingness' is Sartre's absurdity (Jones & Fogelin, 1997, p. 365). With a definition of consciousness and 'the self' as such, the logical conclusion is that we are absolutely free to choose our actions and circumstances and to construct ourselves however we choose - and it is this that is for Sartre the cause of our despair, for in his words, being "condemned to be free" (Sartre, 1943: cited in Jones & Fogelin, 1997, p. 369) the potential for actions or choices in any given situation are limitless. However, curiously, not all human beings appear to be aware of their absolute freedom as surely it would take sincere reflection on the part of each individual in order to discover it, and it is certainly not taught to us as children. This in itself could be said to be a major shortcoming of Sartre's philosophy for whilst ideally we have absolute freedom, we do not live in an ideal world. Surely, in line with a conception of soft-determinism, our potential actions in a given situation are limited by previous choices that brought us to a particular point in the first place, by social convention (although this could be argued to be illusory) and by limits on a person's capacity for rational, or even creative thinking. One may also question the idea of absolute freedom in light of how much control we actually have over our own thoughts and feelings (which in a world of absolute freedom, thoughts must be a part) - and one does not seem to choose an existential attitude, instead "[o]ne finds oneself in it" (Solomon, 1987, p. 240). Does one choose 'insanity'?

Heidegger describes a different sense of the absurd or anxiety, in relation to death and temporality. Whilst Sartre does not make much, if any reference to that fact that we die (a significant omission for an existentialist), death is an axiomatic principle in Heidegger's philosophy. For Heidegger, death denotes an outer limit and accordingly, if it was not for the fact that our existence is finite, we would not be able to derive any meaning from our existence at all. Death is our 'ownmost possibility' in the sense that it marks the outer limit for our lives and we therefore have a responsibility and necessarily, we must recognise and accept this (Heidegger, 1962, p. 294). Death for most people causes a great deal of anxiety. As human beings we are unique in that we are (as far as we know) the only creatures aware of our mortality and the limited nature of our existence (Malpas, 1999, p. 57). A large part of scientific investigation focuses on this fact with a view to discovery of the secret to prolonging life or extending it indefinitely. However, according to Heidegger, this search is erroneous due to the fact that, as stated above, without death we would find no meaning in life. In understanding death we are able to focus on living - death makes it possible to focus on the here and now and that which is important - life.

The result of both Heidegger's and Sartre's existentialising are a 'right' way and a 'wrong' way to live. For Heidegger, these are a difference between being 'authentic' or 'inauthentic'. Authenticity is living life in such a way that one is individual and autonomous in relation to public opinion rather than unquestioningly melding with the social mass - 'das Man' or 'the One' in Heidegger's terms (Young, 1999, p. 112). Being authentic is also living with the certain knowledge that we are going to die - genuinely facing up to death - neither actively seeking it or tempting it, nor ignoring or denying it as a fact by becoming a 'function of the One' (Young, 1999, p. 117). However, according to Heidegger, human beings are mostly inauthentic, possibly due to an unwillingness to stray far from social norms and distance oneself from society and become other than 'average' (Young, 1999, p. 112).

Sartre's version of this is what he calls living in 'good faith' or 'bad faith'. Good faith is based on his idea of absolute freedom in that a person is living in good faith when he or she "in and through choices made on his or her own initiative, without adopting other people's standards or [simply] following their advice" (Jones & Fogelin, 1997, p. 367). So living in accordance with our knowledge of consciousness as nothingness and therefore being absolutely free to 'make' ourselves and choose our actions is according to Sartre, living in good faith. Bad faith is therefore denying that freedom and responsibility for one's actions and circumstances regardless of what they are - ultimately a denial of choice.

Commonalities in existentialism as a philosophy provide a foundation and are what make it important and insightful with respect to who we are, and how and where we find ourselves. The common themes most often found in existentialism relate to concepts of angst, absurdity, death and meaning, and of freedom and responsibility. The catchcry of "existence precedes essence" (originally from Sartre), meaning that we have no inherent essence beyond that which is determined by society - we find ourselves in the world first and then create or construct ourselves - provides an insight that no other philosophy or doctrine has offered. Existentialists generally expound what may be called a 'philosophy of being', with logical outcomes of existentialising which include authentic versus inauthentic existence, good and bad faith. At its worst, existentialism may push one further into the realm of angst and despair, where one realises with crystal-clarity the conditions in which one finds him or herself. At its best, existential thought is empowering - human beings defined as 'free' and 'responsible' agents opens up a world of possibilities and potential actions that one may take in order to live to the utmost and in line with the quote at the head of this essay.

Of its shortcomings, existentialism is: a) not a coherent body of thought; b) does not pay explicit attention to what I think is a major determining element in human action - belief (although in Sartre's 'nothingness', belief may be considered an implicit aspect, as well as in other existentialist writings). What I believe will determine how I act, what I think my possibilities are, how I understand my world and myself and ultimately the aspects of 'reality' that are presented to me. For these reasons, a thorough existentialist philosophy would include an explicit analysis of the role of belief in human life. Finally, c) the existentialist conception of authentic rather than inauthentic living can for the most part be considered an ideal. In practice, authenticity and good faith would take incredible discipline amidst day-to-day societal demands - a fact that is not denied by Heidegger or Sartre, both of whom agree that the human state is mostly that of 'fallenness' (Jones & Fogelin, 1997, p. 359).

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Heidegger, M. (1962). Being and Time, trans. J. Macquarie & E. Robinson, London: SCM Press.
Jones, W.I. & Fogelin, R.J. (1997). The Twentieth Century to Quine and Derrida. (3rd edn). Harcourt Brace.
MacQuarrie, J. (1972). Existentialism. Melbourne: Hutchison & Co.
Malpas, J. (1999). 'Heidegger: Earth and Sky, Gods and Mortals' in Freedom and Death, ed. M. LaCaze. Hobart: Pyrrho Press.
Solomon, R.C. (1987). From Hegel to Existentialism. Melbourne: Oxford University Press.
Young, J. (1998). 'Death and Inauthenticity' in Death and Philosophy, eds. J. Malpas & R. Solomon. London: Routledge.